Monetary Policy Deliberations: Committee Size and Voting Rules

Vincent Maurin and Jean-Pierre Vidal

Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2014, vol. 80, issue 2, 47-83

Abstract: How large should a monetary policy committee be ? Which voting rule should a monetary policy committee adopt ? This paper builds on Condorcet’s jury theorem to analyse the relationships between committee size and voting rules in a model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. It suggests that in large committees majority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes. Under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit the size of the committee. Finally, supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial policy proposals are less likely to be correct, or when payoffs are asymmetric. JEL Classification : D71, D78, D81, E58.

Keywords: monetary policy; collective decision-making; optimal committee size; voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D78 D81 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REL_802_0047 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2014-2-page-47.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_802_0047

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Recherches économiques de Louvain from De Boeck Université
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().