Le contrôle des concentrations en Europe et aux États-Unis. Critères économiques et sécurité juridique

Frédéric Marty

Revue de l'OFCE, 2007, vol. 100, issue 1, 85-120

Abstract: The European Union?s Court of First Instance has overturned several decisions of the European Commission relative to mergers and acquisitions on the ground of failures in the economic assessment of their competitive consequences. As a solution, the Commission, inspired by the US experience, found her decisions less on legal formal criterions than on a case by case economic assessment. Nevertheless, the academic debates relative to economic theories used by antitrust, as coordinated effects or efficiency gains could create an additional legal uncertainty, prejudicial to firms, which encounter more difficulties to foresee the antitrust authority?s decision. If this decision were more soundly based in theory, it would appear as more discretional. JEL codes: K10, K21, L13, L40.

JEL-codes: K10 K21 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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