Réduction du temps de travail et innovations organisationnelles négociées

Philippe Askenazy

Revue d'économie politique, 2001, vol. 111, issue 2, 247-269

Abstract: This article studies the consequences of a reduction of legal working time (RWT), using an union/employer bargaining model over the organization of work. A RWT can induce a higher flexibility of work, which is become bearable for reduced work time. This flexibility helps to finance a full wage compensation, as foreseen by the Aubry agreements. In this setting, on the short run, the job creations can be massive but are the outcome of social tax cuts. The long-run impact of the 35 hours depends on the productive complementarity between the social (the 35 hours), organizational and technological innovations. Classification JEL : J28, J21, J51, K31, L23

Keywords: 35 hours; union/employer bargaining; organizational changement; job (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J21 J28 J51 K31 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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