Rémunération optimale des dirigeants: faut-il interdire les bénéfices privés ?

Christian At, Nathalie Chappe, Pierre-Henri Morand () and Lionel Thomas

Revue d'économie politique, 2006, vol. 116, issue 6, 831-846

Abstract: This model captures one of the key elements of the value diversion controversy. Within a standard mixed model, we show that shareholders are better off if they allow a certain amount of diversion even if it generates a dead-weight loss.

Keywords: private benefits; managerial compensation; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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