Jeux de coalitions et oligopoles

Aymeric Lardon

Revue d'économie politique, 2017, vol. 127, issue 4, 601-635

Abstract: We survey the results on the core of cooperative oligopoly games. The core is an appropriate set-valued solution for this class of games which deals with the stability of collusive agreements among firms. The aim of this article is to propose a typology of oligopolistic markets in order to put into perspective the results on the core. We highlight necessary and/or sufficient conditions (quantity or price competition, market size, cost heterogeneity, transferable technologies, blocking rules, ...) under which a stable collusive agreement exists.

Keywords: TU-games; oligopolies; collusive agreement; core; balancedness; convexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Jeux de coalitions et oligopoles (2016)
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