Les mécanismes de défense anti-acquisition profitent-ils vraiment aux actionnaires ?

Christine Noël-Lemaître and Etienne Redor

Revue française de gestion, 2009, vol. n° 198-199, issue 8, 259-275

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present the main anti-takeover mechanisms in order to question their usefulness for shareholders and managers through a literature review. By confronting the entrenchment and the shareholders interest theories, we show that most of anti-takeover mechanisms are more beneficial for managers than for shareholders, because they allow to increase their power and their personal benefits. The conclusions of this paper should reinforce the vigilance of shareholders because antitakeover mechanisms would result in wealth destruction.

Date: 2009
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