L'effet de la structure du réseau du dirigeant sur sa rémunération. Le cas français

Marie-Hélène Vigliano and Germain Barré

Revue française de gestion, 2010, vol. n° 202, issue 3, 97-109

Abstract: ? Marie-Hélène Vigliano, Germain Barré This article aims to study the influence of the CEO?s network structure on his compensation. This effect can be analyzed through the links that the CEO of a particular company has with other CEOs who belong to the same boards. A model is developed and tested using an approach based on social network analysis and a sample, consisting of 103 executives of French companies listed on the CAC 40 and SBF 120, is analyzed for the year 2002. The results of this research show that, in France, the CEO?s network determines his compensation.

Date: 2010
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