Managers et espions. L’affaire Renault

Hervé Laroche and Christelle Théron

Revue française de gestion, 2016, vol. N° 254, issue 1, 37-51

Abstract: In 2011, the French car manufacturer Renault suddenly fires three managers suspected of spying. These executives were in fact innocent. Such an astounding mistake of decision-making (the most visible feature of this case) conceals several underlying deviant processes: organizational paranoia, follow-up of inadequate actions fed by secrecy and lie, development of micro-institutions with deviant practices. Such processes invite us to think about possible pitfalls organizational actors are likely to be trapped into.

Date: 2016
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