Les manquements d’initiés en France. À qui profite le crime ?

Elisabeth Fonteny

Revue française de gestion, 2017, vol. N° 269, issue 8, 39-63

Abstract: Insiders detected and accused in France between 2001 and 2011 are most often professionals of financial markets, trading upon positive inside information. Corporate insiders are only executives. They trade upon negative private information, much earlier than other insiders. Illegal gains are higher in case of positive inside information, when they concern big capitalizations and when the insider is a corporate executive. The financial penalty increases with undue profits and the number of days of illegal trades.

Date: 2017
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