Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem

Parimal Bag and Hamid Sabourian

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: We consider a multi-award generalisation of King Solomon’s problem: k identical and indivisible awards should be distributed among agents, k 1) prizes efficiently in sub-game perfect equilibria without any monetary transfers in equilibrium. Finally, in the multi-awards case we relax the complete information assumption and achieve implementation of efficient allocation by iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, using generalisation of Olszewski’s (2003) mechanism.

Keywords: Solomon’s problem; prizes; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2004-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: ET
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem (2005)
Working Paper: Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0418

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