The Role of Benchmarking in Incentive Regulation: Lessons from Electricity Distribution

Michael G. Pollitt

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper discusses the use of electricity distribution benchmarking within incentive regulation as part of price control reviews. It compares different methods, with an emphasis on efficiency benchmarking. We consider the choices facing the regulator in selecting a benchmarking method and in implementing it and how these may evolve over time. We contrast the experiences of regulators in Great Britain, the Netherlands and Germany in doing benchmarking within price control reviews and offer some lessons for the future. We suggest that benchmarking should be expected to evolve over time and that regulators should consider a 'benchmarking of benchmarking' with respect to their currently preferred benchmarking methods.

Keywords: DEA; SFA; COLS; Frontier; Efficiency; Benchmarking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-30
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pub ... pe-pdfs/cwpe2647.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:2647

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jake Dyer ().