Towards the Partial Deregulation of Great Britain’s Electricity Networks

Adam Bell

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Electricity network costs are an increasing proportion of consumer bills in Great Britain. At the same time and in common with other markets, lower distributed generation costs are enabling a degree of defection from the public network. This creates a risk that consumers not able to defect are left with higher fixed costs, counterbalanced with reduced network reinforcement requirements. This paper proposes that this be managed by policymakers by removing economic regulation from networks for certain consumer types and enabling price discovery.

Keywords: Electricity Network Regulation; Grid Defection; Distributed Generation; Network Tariff Design; Utility Death Spiral (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 L94 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:2648

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