Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law?

John Armour

Working Papers from Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Examines the economic case for rules of company law which regulate the raising and maintenance of share capital by companies. Argues that the current rules are unlikely to enhance the efficiency of the markets which they regulate, and makes a tentative conclusion.

Keywords: corporate law; default rules; creditor protection; share capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G38 K12 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-12
Note: PRO-2
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/cbrwp148.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp148

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ruth Newman ().