Strategic Cops and Robbers?

Giovanni Mastrobuoni and Emily Owens

Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: We propose a new framework to investigate whether criminals exhibit strategic behavior in response to the criminal law and their enforcement. Unique data on commercial robberies in Milan allow us to examine the decisions robbers make regarding weapon choice, number of accomplices, and the type of business targeted. Our analysis explores the relationship between these decisions, the expected return from the robbery, and the probability of arrest, considering the constraints imposed by Italian law, which prescribes differential punishments based on certain criminal choices. We find some evidence that robbers act in accordance with expected utility maximization, particularly when operating in groups.

Keywords: Police; Crime; Robberies; Strategic Behavior. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:741

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