MONOTONICITY IMPLIES STRATEGY-PROOFNESS FOR CORRESPONDENCES

Klaus Nehring and Massimiliano Marcellino
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Massimiliano Marcellino: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 193, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.

Pages: 25
Date: 2003-01-08
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