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Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior

Burkhard Schipper, Martin Meier and Aviad Heifetz
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Aviad Heifetz: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 39, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional dominance.

Keywords: Unawareness; extensive-form games; extensive-form rationalizability; prudent rationalizability; iterative conditional dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57
Date: 2009-10-28
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior (2009) Downloads
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