Allocations and manipulation in Kyoto type protocols

Sudhir A. Shah
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Sudhir A. Shah: Delhi School of Economics

No 125, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics

Abstract: We study an incomplete information, non-cooperative model of the determination of national emission endowments under a Kyoto type protocol with heterogeneous nations. The model generates a link between national types and equilibrium na-tional emission caps. We analyze this link to (a) derive the type-contingent ordering of emission allocations, (b) study the effects of growth on emission al-locations, and (c) study the strategies that nations can use to manipulate the emission allocation process. Synthesizing these results allows us to derive the implications of national heterogeneity and asymmetry of economic power in the capping process.

Keywords: correlated equilibrium; heterogeneity; incomplete information; Kyoto protocol; manipulation; non-cooperative game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H41 Q21 Q25 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2004-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-geo, nep-reg and nep-sea
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