EXISTENCE AND OPTIMALITY OF MEDIATION SCHEMES FOR GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION

Sudhir A. Shah
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Sudhir A. Shah: Delhi School of Economics

No 51, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics

Abstract: This paper explicitly considers the possibility of a mediator selecting equilibria in incomplete information environments. We study two models of mediated communication in incomplete information games the first model with a disinterested mediator and second with an interested mediator. The notion of ex post incentive compatibility (EPJC) is defined as a solution concept for such models and its existence is shown in very general settings. The second main result shows the existence of an optimal EPIC when optimality is defined in terms of the mediator's welfare.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1997-11
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