Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities
Bhagwan Chowdhry and
Mark Grinblatt
University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management from Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA
Abstract:
A model of security design based on the principle of information aggregation and alignment is used to show that (i) firms needing to finance their operations should issue different securities to different groups of investors in order to aggregate their disparate information and (ii) each security should be highly correlated (closely aligned) with the private information signal of the investor to whom it is marketed. This alignment reduces the adverse selection penalty paid by a firm with superior information. Adverse selection costs are often contingent on ex post publicly observable and contractible state variables such as exchange rates. In such cases, debt contracts are dominated by currency swaps and optimal securities, in general, are derivative contracts that are contingent on state variables that influence adverse selection costs. This is because the netting of cash flows in these derivative contracts, in effect, alters the state-by-state seniority of different claims in a desirable way.
Date: 1997-04-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0js61067.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities (2001) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:anderf:qt0js61067
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management from Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().