Problems of Democratic Control in European Security and Defense Politics – a View from Peace and Conflict Research

Wolfgang Wagner

Institute of European Studies, Working Paper Series from Institute of European Studies, UC Berkeley

Abstract: Since EU members have agreed to establish integrated military forces and to decide jointly on their deployment in European institutions, the EU’s “democratic deficit” is no longer confined to issues of common market governance but also includes foreign, security and defense politics. Drawing on recent debates in peace and conflict research, I will argue that a democratic deficit in European security and defense politics is not only worrying for its own sake but also because a growing body of literature regards the democratic control of security and defense politics as the best guarantee to maintain peaceful and cooperative relations with other states.

Keywords: Center for German and European Studies; CIIP; comparative; conferences; European studies; IES; institute; Institute of European studies; institutions; international; society; working paper (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:bineur:qt65b9q82m

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