The Optimal Number of Governments for Economic Development

Robert D. Cooter

Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics

Abstract: In the private sector, many small firms imply shallow hierarchy and narrow product lines. Similarly, in the public sector many small governments imply shallow hierarchy and narrow governments. This paper explains when replacing broad, deep governments with shallow, narrow governments increases stability and reduces corruption. My general conclusion is that developing nations plagued by instability and corruption probably have too few elections and too few democratic governments.

Date: 1999-03-29
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