Expressive Law and Economics

Robert Cooter

Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Program in Law and Economics

Abstract: This article develops an economic theory of expressive law. By expressing social values, law can tip a system of social norms into a new equilibrium. This process can create or destroy a social norm without changing individual values. In addition, law can change the individual values of rational people. Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that attaches a psychological penalty to a forbidden act. A rational person internalizes a norm when commitment conveys an advantage relative to the original preferences and the changed preferences. I call such a commitment a Pareto self-improvement. By creating opportunities for Pareto self-improvements, law induces rational people to change their preferences. Inducing change in this way respects individual preferences, rather favoring a particular moral theory.

Date: 1998-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (180)

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Journal Article: Expressive Law and Economics (1998)
Working Paper: Expressive Law and Economics (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt3w34j60j

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