Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms

Roland Kirstein and Robert Cooter

Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Program in Law and Economics

Abstract: Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. However, if a team members assumes the role of an "internal" Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. External Anti-sharing may induce the team members to choose efficient effort. The paper presents possible applications of Anti-Sharing: while internal Anti-Sharing may provide an explanation for the existence of senior (or managing) partners, external Anti-Sharing leads to a new theory of the incorporated firm.

Keywords: D23; L23; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12-24
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