On Separating Equilibria with Positive Excess Demand for a Monopolistic Market

Cheng-Zhong Qin

University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Abstract: This paper offers an explanation for the rationality of why successful businesses sometimes maintain excess demand. The explanation is motivated from the signaling role of excess demand for firms. Considering a monopolistic market for a good whose quality is not known to the consumers, a firm may use excess demand as a signal by strategically cutting back its supply. The paper establishes conditions with which there exists a separating equilibrium with positive excess demand. It also demonstrates that it is more profitable to signal quality by excess demand than by (traditional) advertising under certain conditions. This in turn shows that restraining supply is another way to advertise.

Keywords: advertising; queuing; signaling; perfect Bayesian equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03-28
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