Lobbying for Judicial Reform: The Role of the Mexican Supreme Court in Institutional Selection

Jeffrey K. Staton

University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies from Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego

Abstract: While the behavior of judges clearly affects the success of judicial reform efforts, it is not clear how judges might influence the selection of judicial institutions aimed at building healthier courts. In this paper, I suggest that judges might play an important role in defining the judicial reform agenda by both directly lobbying important policy makers and by going public. I develop these claims through a discussion of the Mexican Supreme Court’s recent efforts to induce further judicial reform. I consider the Court’s important successes and failures and discuss important constraints on the ability of judges to influence the reform process through lobbying.

Date: 2003-05-15
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