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Plurality Rule Works in Three-Candidate Elections

Bernardo Moreno () and M. Socorro Puy

No E2003/09, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: In the citizen-candidate approach each citizen chooses whether or not to run as candidate. In this paper we find that the strategic entry-exit decision of the candidates eliminates one of the most undesirable properties of Plurality rule, namely to elect a poor candidate in three-candidate elections since as we show, the Condorcet winner among the self-declared candidates is always elected. All the equilibrium configurations where up to three candidates enter the race are described. We additionally find that it is in those equilibria where four or more citizens become candidate that the Condorcet loser among the self-declared candidates can be elected.

Keywords: Citizen-candidate; Condorcet Consistency; Plurality Rule. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections (2009) Downloads
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