 Echilibrul Nash si alegerile prezidentiale din anul 2000 în România (II)Andrei Dospinescu () and
Bogdan Lucian Dospinescu
Revista de Economie Industriala (Journal of Industrial Eonomics), 2006, vol. 4, issue 4, 14 Abstract: In the 2000 Romanian Presidential election the results after the first round placed Ion Iliescu in first position, Corneliu Vadim Tudor in second, Theodor Stolojan in third and Mugur Isarescu in fourth. The first two candidates Ion Iliescu and Corneliu Vadim Tudor were close enough to ensure a tied second round. In these conditions it could be considered a surprise that Ion Iliescu won the election with a comfortable margin. We use the game theory approach to show that the attacks against Vadim and the increase in the number of strategic liberal voters are not efficient in bringing such a comfortable margin. In these conditions, without the appeal of Theodor Stolojan and Mugur Isarescu such a high margin of win in the case of Ion Iliescu would not have been possible even though the political attacks against Vadim were so well orchestrated. This suggests that the actions of the two liberal presidential candidates were impossible to ignore and that they were strategic players in the comfortable win of Ion Iliescu against Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Date: 2006 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cei:recind:v:4:y:2006:i:4:p:14 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Revista de Economie Industriala (Journal of Industrial Eonomics) from Centre for Industrial Economics and Services Contact information at EDIRC. |
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