Candidate nomination procedures andpolitical selection: evidence from LatinAmerican parties

Fernando Aragon

STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: This paper explores empirically the role of nomination procedures on politicalselection and the determinants for adopting contestable selection methods such asprimaries. Using data from Latin American parties, I find evidence that politicalcompetition increases probability of primary adoption. Moreover, primarynominated candidates obtained larger vote shares and during their mandatecountries experienced improvements in several measures of quality of government.The results exploit within party variation and are robust to relevant identificationconcerns. Together, these findings suggest that nomination procedures matter forpolitical selection and that the quality differences are significant enough to influenceelectoral and economic outcomes.

Keywords: Primaries; political selection; political competition; quality of politicians. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H39 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stieop:003

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