On Connections Between Renegotiation Proof Sets of Long Finitely and Infinitely Repeated Games with Low Discounting

Saikat Datta

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: This paper looks at connections between Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium sets for finitely and infinitely repeated games. We look at the Benoit and Krishna (1993) definition of renegotiation proof sets for discounted finitely repeated games. We focus on the long run behaviour of these sets for low discounting. If these sets converge to a set when the time horizon goes to infinity, then this limit set is an Internally Renegotiation Proof set (almost) for the corresponding infinitely repeated game as defined by Ray (1994). However, if such a limit does not exist, then the collection of the limit point sets can look like a collection of non-stationary internally renegotiation proof sets.

Date: 1996-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:/1996/304

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