A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly

Michael A. Raith

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: Under which circumstances do oligopolists have an incentive to share private information about a stochastic demand or stochastic costs? We present a general model which includes virtually all models of the existing literature on information sharing as special cases. The analysis reveals that in contrast to the apparent inconclusivenss of previous results some simple principles determining the incentives to share information can be obtained. Most existing results are generalized and some interpretations are corrected, leading to a single general theory of the topic.

Keywords: Oligopoly; information sharing; stochastic demand; stochastic costs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:260

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