Energy Crisis Relief as Implicit Insurance: Fossil Import Dependence and Policy Design

Timothé Beaufils, Ulrich Eydam, Maik Heinemann, Matthias Kalkuhl, Nikolaj Moretti, Andreas Peichl, Philipp M. Richter and Joschka Wanner

No 84, EconPol Policy Brief from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Abstract: Key MessagesEuropean economies rely heavily on fossil fuel imports and are exposed to global price shocksRelief measures face a trilemma: targeting, incentives, and feasibility rarely alignRelief measures can function as taxpayerfinanced implicit insurance against energy crisesBased on recent crisis responses, relief implies EU-wide permanent subsidies of around EUR18/tCO₂ (gas) and EUR 10/tCO₂ (oil)Such implicit subsidies weaken incentives to reduce fossil dependence and increase vulnerability to future crises

Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/EconPol_PolicyBrief_84.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:econpb:_84

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EconPol Policy Brief from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().