Preventing Global Catastrophes

Hitoshi Matsushima
Additional contact information
Hitoshi Matsushima: Department of Economics, University of Tokyo

No CARF-F-573, CARF F-Series from Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

Abstract: To prevent global catastrophes that would cause irreversible and enormous damage to the humanity and environment, we should not expect that only philanthropy and tacit collusion suffice without taking any measures. While global citizens are under a lack of strong coercive power, it is necessary to carefully design explicit negotiation procedures that make effective use of the limited social order. In doing so, it is necessary to design institutional rules that are robust against unforeseen circumstances where many citizens happen to be irrational and adhere to uncooperative attitudes. We show a possibility that, under a constraint of sovereignty protection, there are commitment rules in a global negotiation forum that can uniquely elicit incentives for cooperative behavior from agents while coping with such unforeseen circumstances.

Pages: 37
Date: 2023-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.carf.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/F573.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf573

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CARF F-Series from Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().