A Case against Taxes and Quotas on High-Skill Emigration - Working Paper 363

Michael Clemens

No 363, Working Papers from Center for Global Development

Abstract: Skilled workers have a rising tendency to emigrate from developing countries, raising fears that their departure harms the poor. To mitigate such harm, researchers have proposed a variety of policies designed to tax or restrict high-skill migration. Those policies have been justified as Pigovian regulations to raise efficiency by internalizing externalities, and as non-Pigovian regulations grounded in equity or ethics. This paper challenges both sets of justifications, arguing that Pigovian regulations on skilled emigration are inefficient and non-Pigovian regulations are inequitable and unethical. It concludes by discussing a different class of policy intervention that, in contrast, has the potential to raise welfare.

Keywords: brain drain; migration; immigration; emigration; mobility; labor; skill; education; human capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 J24 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-mig and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cgd:wpaper:363

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