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It’s All Fun and Games? The Persistent Treatment Effects of Willingness-to-Pay Experiments

Jenny Aker (), Brian Dillon (), Leticia Donoso-Peña () and Anne Krahn ()
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Jenny Aker: Cornell University
Brian Dillon: Cornell University
Leticia Donoso-Peña: Tufts University
Anne Krahn: Tufts University

No 714, Working Papers from Center for Global Development

Abstract: Willingness-to-pay (WTP) experiments have been widely used to assess demand for a variety of products. Do they also generate persistent treatment effects? We answer this question using a randomized controlled trial of a baseline WTP experiment, combined with in-person and phone survey data over a four-year period. We find that a simple experiment leads to positive and persistent effects on adoption and usage of an improved storage technology, as well as disadoption of traditional technologies. These results are primarily driven by households who experienced the product, rather than information or salience. Failing to account for demand elicitation experiments conducted at baseline may affect the external validity of the broader experiments in which they are embedded.

Keywords: Willingness to pay; Becker-DeGroot-Marschak; Field Experiment; persistent treatment effects; agriculture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D44 O12 O13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2025-02-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cgd:wpaper:714

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