Elections and Rural Road Construction: Evidence from India

Ahana Basistha (), Amrita Dhillon and Arka Roy Chaudhuri
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Amrita Dhillon: Kings College and CAGE
Arka Roy Chaudhuri: Shiv Nadar University

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the existence of electoral cycles in infrastructure provision in the context of a large rural road building program in India. We use data covering 150,000 roads over a decade to demonstrate an increase in road building activity before state elections. These electoral cycles in rural road building do not translate into efficiency losses in terms of quality, cost or delay. However, we find evidence that politicians build roads with a lower stipulated construction time before elections. In line with our model’s predictions, we also find that electoral constituencies with a larger share of uninformed voters display larger electoral cycles.

Keywords: Political Business Cycles; Elections; Public Goods; Rural Infrastructure; India JEL Classification: D72; D73; H41; O18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-pol, nep-tre and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:712

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