Colonialism, Political risk, and firm performance: Evidence from India
James Fenske,
Bishnupriya Gupta and
Junxi Liu
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James Fenske: University of Warwick
Bishnupriya Gupta: University of Warwick and CAGE
Junxi Liu: University of Warwick
CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)
Abstract:
Did political risk constrain foreign investment under colonial rule? We compare British and Indian firms in interwar India using novel panel data. Although risk in creased for British firms, we find little evidence of capital withdrawal. Financial outcomes differed mainly across industries, while board Indianization and cross-group interlocks increased only gradually and unevenly. British managing agents likewise remained concentrated in familiar sectors, accommodating Indian participation without substantial diversification. Rather than withdrawing uniformly, British firms added Indian directors where local capital, market knowledge, and commercial connections became valuable, while remaining concentrated in industries supported by established expertise and com mercial networks.
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-his
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