Wages and Sanctions against Hierarchical Corruption

Fadi Kanso ()
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Fadi Kanso: CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université

No 51, CAE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM

Abstract: The general aim of this paper is to contribute to the study of factors that decrease corruption in the public sector and especially in tax administration. A matter of particular interest will be the effects of raising civil servants’ wages and penalties on the behavior of agents in case of tax evasion. We will also look into the role of civil society and the dismissal sanction in a country of high level of unemployment in the fight against corruption. Using a model referring to a typical agency problem, we will demonstrate how the coalition among civil servants and taxpayers may be broken in order to curb tax evasion and the incidence of corruption.

Keywords: Governmental corruption; tax evasion; coalition; game theory; behavioral of economic agents; wages and penalties in public sector (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C61 C7 D73 H1 H26 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2007
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http://junon.u-3mrs.fr/afa10w21/RePEc/cgm/wpaper/DR_51_0607_kanso.pdf First version, 2007 (application/pdf)
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