Strategic Interactions and Gender Cues: Evidence from Social Preference Games

Hernán Bejerano (), Matias Busso () and Juan Francisco Santos ()
Additional contact information
Hernán Bejerano: Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE) and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University
Matias Busso: Inter-American Development Bank
Juan Francisco Santos: Inter-American Development Bank

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: This paper studies trust, reciprocity, and bargaining using a large-scale online experiment in six Latin American countries. Participants were randomly assigned to play trust and ultimatum games under conditions in which the gender of their counterpart was either disclosed or withheld. On average, gender disclosure did not affect behavior. However, disaggregated results show systematic differences. Men displayed higher levels of trust and reciprocity, particularly when interacting with women, and offered larger shares to women in bargaining. Women, by contrast, reciprocated more when paired with men. These findings show how gendered interactions can influence economic behavior, even when counterpart information is conveyed minimally.

Keywords: Trust; Reciprocity; Bargaining; Gender; Latin America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D91 J16 O54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/431/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:25-17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Megan Luetje ().