Emission Taxes and Standards for an Asymmetric Oligopoly

Ngo Long and Antoine Soubeyran

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We characterize optimal firm-specific emission tax rates, and optimal firm-specific emission standards, and provide intuitive explanation on differential treatments. We show that there is a unified framework for deriving firm-specific policy measures. When firms are identical, the optimal policy may call for unequal treatments of equals. When firms are not identical, we characterize the optimal degree of dispersion of tax rates. The unequal treatments of unequals is explained in terms of the motive of the government to affect industry concentration. Our new approach is geometric in nature and enables us to give optimality conditions in global terms. On décrit les propriétés des taux de taxes pigouviennes optimales pour les firmes polluantes, ainsi que les standards d'émission optimaux. On démontre qu'il y a un cadre unifié pour analyser ces deux instruments d'intervention. Pour atteindre l'optimum social dans le cas où les firmes sont identiques, il faut les traiter de manière différente. On explique le traitement inégal des égaux en terme du motif d'influencer la concentration de l'industrie. Notre méthode de solution est de nature géométrique, ce qui nous permet d'obtenir les conditions d'optimalité globales.

Keywords: Pollution; oligopoly; Pollution; oilgopole (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D63 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-02-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2001s-07.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Webmaster ().