A Legal Analytical Study of the Types of Contract Termination and Their Legal Effects on the Parties under Iraqi Legislation
Ali Hussein Qasim () and
Hanan Talib Ashour ()
American Journal of Law and Political Science, 2025, vol. 4, issue 1, 64 - 73
Abstract:
Aim: This study aimed to examine the legal frameworks governing contract termination in Iraq, highlighting judicial oversight, parties’ rights, and implications for legal and economic stability Methods: The study adopts a doctrinal legal analysis supported by case reviews and statutory interpretation of Iraqi contract law. Results: The findings reveal that Iraqi courts play a crucial role in balancing contractual freedom with protection of vulnerable parties, but gaps remain in the enforcement of termination clauses in commercial contracts. Conclusion: The study concludes that while Iraq’s legal system provides mechanisms for fair contract termination, reforms are needed to reduce ambiguity in non-essential contracts and enhance judicial efficiency. Recommendation: The study recommends strengthening legislative clarity on unilateral termination rights and enhancing judicial capacity to resolve disputes promptly.
Keywords: Contract termination; legal termination; contractual termination; civil rights; essential and non-essential contracts; judicial oversight; Iraqi law; legal stability; commercial transactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cjk:ajlaps:v:4:y:2025:i:1:p:64-73:id:402
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