Legal and Economic Analysis of Cartels, their Enforcement and the Leniency Program

Rastislav Funta ()
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Rastislav Funta: Charles University in Prague

DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, 2012, issue 2, 35-47

Abstract: Cartels are generally acknowledged as one of the most serious forms of anti-competitive behaviour between competitors. Due to the fact that competition authorities have faced difficulties in enforcing their competition policy with respect to cartels, the leniency program represents a legal, effective and often the only tool available for antitrust enforcers to detect the most serious types of agreements restricting competition. EU and US leniency programs share some common features, but there are also some differences which will be highlighted in the following paper, which will also provide an in-depth legal & economic analysis of cartel law enforcement on both sides of the Atlantic.

Keywords: Antitrust; Cartels; Leniency Program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cmn:journl:y:2012:i:2:p:35-47

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