Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy

Cheng Wang and Stephen Williamson

GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

Keywords: MORAL HAZARD; UNEMPLOYMENT; UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE; EMPLOYMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J20 J21 J60 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy (1996)
Working Paper: Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy (1996)
Working Paper: Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy (1995)
Working Paper: Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy (1995)
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