Common Ownership and Intertemporal Price Discrimination

Makoto Watanabe, Patrick Arnold and Marc Möller

No 26-020E, CIGS Working Paper Series from The Canon Institute for Global Studies

Abstract: This paper considers the effects of common ownership on advance purchase markets featuring intertemporal price discrimination (e.g. airline tickets). Common ownership increases advance prices, while spot prices can decrease. We show that common ownership is anticompetitive but the increase in average transacted prices is smaller than under uniform pricing, although consumers shift towards more informed, more expensive purchases. Common ownership is less detrimental for consumers than under uniform pricing and can even benefit consumers when consumers are sufficiently uninformed about their preferences in advance.

Pages: 30
Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cigs.canon/en/uploads/2026/11/WP26-020E_261028_m.watanabe.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cnn:wpaper:26-020e

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIGS Working Paper Series from The Canon Institute for Global Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The Canon Institute for Global Studies ().