Neutrality And efficiency in Colombian Banking System
Mónica ROA Rodriguez ()
No 11215, Archivos de Economía from Departamento Nacional de Planeación
Abstract:
Although efficiency has been tested previously in Colombia, studies mislead the main element which is faced by the system: risk. Most studies assume banks are risk neutral, this fact tends to underestimate efficiency, especially when a country faces an economic crisis, like the one of the late nineties. Indeed a bank which may be inefficient on the traditional way (because of its high costs) may be efficient on the risk approach since it considers the trade-off between risk and efficiency. The current paper is based on Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon work bur focusing on credit and market risk impact on efficiency. In addition, one studies how neutrality behavior (and in turn efficiency) changes over time (especially in crises) for specific group of financial intermediaries, it means the paper tests how credit and market risk affects on a different way the three groups of financial intermediaries selected (banks, financial corporations and leasing companies). In addition, it is assessed how the legal restrictions in credit and solvency are reflected on the efficiency of the system.
Keywords: X-efficiency; colombian banking sector; risk management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G2 G21 G28 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2010-08-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Estudios%20Econmicos/366.pdf
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000118:011215
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Archivos de Economía from Departamento Nacional de Planeación Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Carlos Fernando Rincon Rojas ().