Descentralización (y centralización) sin representación: a propósito de lacomposición territorial del congreso colombiano
Jorge Armando Rodríguez
Econógrafos, Escuela de Economía from Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID
Abstract:
This paper explores the territorial composition of the Colombian bicameral Congress in the legislatures of the period 1991-2018. It illustrates the prevalence and persistence of the phenomenon of Departments without a Senator, which has affected small and medium-sized jurisdictions in population. It shows that the composition of the House of Representatives and that of the Senate tend to be similar, with predominance of the most populous territorial entities. It argues that the rules of composition of the Senate are not territorially inclusive and lead to an excessive geographical concentration of political power, missing out on the possibilities offered by bicameralism as a balance of power mechanism in a democracy. The problems of territorial political representation in the center are not inconsequential: It is there where the legal framework of decentralization and centralization is forged. The paper discusses some proposals and measures aimed at addressing such problems.
Keywords: Constitutional law; Political representation; National Congress; Bicameralism; Electoral system; Subnational governments; Fiscal decentralization; Centralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H77 K10 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2017-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000176:022875
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