“Es” y “Deber ser” en las teorías de la decisión. Acerca de la condición normativa de la teoría de la decisión racional

Giancarlo Romano G

Econógrafos, Escuela de Economía from Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID

Abstract: The paper discusses the exposure of Santiago y Cante (2009) of the rational choice theory (RCT) and the expected utility model and controvert his claim according to which the Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky threatens the normative status of the RCT. The paper explains what that status is and its conceptual and prescriptive justification. I also show some normative implications of the PT hardly to sustain and challenge that it can serve as a normative model alternative to RCT.

Keywords: Choice; expected utility; prospect theory; rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2012-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000176:022972

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