[Documento] Controlling Shareholders and Contract Theory: A Review of Literature
Roberto Fortich Mesa ()
Revista Economía y Región, 2018, vol. 12, issue 1, 157-162
Abstract:
In this survey I succinctly review the contract theory literature on the rebellious manager type of agency conflict. Freedom of enterprise, private property, and the incentives of businessmen to make profits are essential values of the capitalist economic system. When economic institutions that preserve these values are in place, capital circulates, businesses invest and the economy grows. Just as prices do not need to be intervened for markets to work, capital too can work when left alone: savings are transformed into investments, prospects of future cash flows are taken at present value, and small-investor distrust is overcome even in the face of unfamiliar risky enterprises.
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://revistas.utb.edu.co/index.php/economiayregion/article/view/192
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000411:018502
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Revista Economía y Región from Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Economia y Region ().