Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated

Paulo Monteiro

No 1997042, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this note I prove the existence of the optimal-pay auction when signals are correlated.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-06-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal All-pay Auction When Signals Are Correlated (2000)
Working Paper: Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated (1999)
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