Further remarks on strategic stability in plurality games

Francesco De Sinopoli

No 1999030, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this note we show that, for generic plurality games (i.e., voting games under plurality rule), an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e., with two or more candidates elected with positive probability), is regular and, hence, a Mertens' stable set. Furthermore, we show that stronger equilibrium concepts, than stability, do not guarantee the existence of a solution for some generic plurality games. A final example shows the weakness of the simple sophisticated voting principle.

Keywords: Plurality rule; regular equilibria; sophisticated voting; stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-05-01
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