Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents: a comment

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser () and Uday Rajan

No 2004050, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this note we consider a basic property of common agency models: pure strategy equilibria of games where principals compete in direct mechanisms are robust to the possibility that principals might deviate and use more complex indirect mechanisms to design their contracts. We show that this property can be generalized to multi-principal multi-agent models.

JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07
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